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Abstract 
The most recognizable historically approved methods of proportional division of mandates in collegiate bodies refer to an ideal 
assumption where each vote is associated with identical number of representatives. Proportional methods of distribution such as 
Hamilton’s and divisor methods of Jefferson, Adams or Webster cannot be directly applied to the allocation of seats between the 
Member States in the European Parliament because of the wide variation in their population. A desire to ensure appropriate 
representation have triggered legal acceptance of degressive proportionality rule contained in the Lisbon Treaty. The new 
principle, however, does not allow determining an unambiguous solution. The article presents the allocations which can be 
obtained reaching the classical methods of proportional division, taking into account degressively proportional allocation 
functions. 
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1. Introduction 
The principle of proportional representation as a general rule od allocation of seats in the electoral law is tied with 
the necessity to determine a method of converting real proportions to the integers. The number of developed 
solutions, however, shows that there is no ideal one. Each of the proposed methods of rounding the exact proportions 
has certain drawbacks, known in literature as a proneness to certain paradoxes. The situation is even more complex 
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in the case of apportionment of mandates in the European Parliament. Lack of a clear indication defining the 
allocation degressiveness additionally complicates seeking the proper solution – there are many possible to be used. 
The aim of the article is to show the applicability of the methods used for the proportional division to 
degressively proportional allocations. Basing on the known families of allocation functions the real apportionments 
are calculated and then, using classical methods, apportionments with integer values are determined. This approach 
allows to obtain weakly degressively proportional allocations in the sense of the Cambridge Compromise. Moreover, 
a method enabling to specify the measure of the equitable spread of degressive proportionality weight over all 
countries is indicated and on its basis an accordingly optimal allocation is selected. 
2. Proportional methods of apportionment 
The apportionment problem concerns determining a division of a given integer number of seats 0H ≥  
proportionally among a set of n states according to their populations 
i
p , 1,2,...,i n= . The problem arises when the 
values of number of citizens of the state i  divided by the total population 1 2 ... nP p p p= + + +  are not integer. One 
need to find then a vector 
1 2
( , ,..., )
n
a a a a=  of nonnegative integers such that 
1
n
ii
a H
=
=∑  (Balinski & Young, 
1980). 
The most well-known classical methods giving a solution of determining sought vector a  are methods of 
Hamilton, Jefferson, Adams, Webster, Dean and Hill. First of them, also known as the method of largest reminder, 
was proposed by the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton in 1792. The procedure of finding the 
apportionment is as follows. For a given vector of populations of the states 
1 2
( , ,..., )
n
p p p p=   compute a vector of 
quotas 
1 2
( , ,..., )
n
q q q q= , where /
i i
q p H P= . Next, order the fractional reminders [ ]
i i i
d q q= − , where [t] denotes 
rounding downwards, in descending sequence 
1 2
...
n
i i i
d d d≥ ≥ ≥ . Assign each state i [qi] seats and the remaining 
1
[ ]
n
ii
m H q
=
= −∑  ones to states 
1 2
, , ...,
m
i i i
d d d  (Balinski & Young, 1977).  
Jefferson’s method, proposed by Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State, was an alternative for Hamilton’s 
solution, who was his main opponent in the U.S. government. According to this procedure one should find a divisor 
d such that 
1
[ / ]
n
ii
p d H
=
=∑ . For any vector p and total number of seats H there always exists such a divisor. 
Furthermore, there usually is an interval of divisors returning the same allocation (Young, 1994). 
Adams’ and Webster’s methods are simple modifications of Jefferson’s method. Author of the first one proposed 
that values /
i
p d  should be rounded upwards – one, therefore, needs to find a divisor d such that 
1
[ / ]
n
ii
p d H
=
=∑  
(where [t] denotes the smallest integer equal ore more than t). In Webster’s solution fractions are rounded to the 
nearest integer, that is [ / 1/ 2]
i
p d + . As in method of Jefferson there always exists a divisor giving sought 
allocation (Young, 1994). 
The other two divisor methods of Dean and Hill differ only in the way of rounding as well. Hill’s procedure 
orders to assign state [ / ]
i
i p d  seats if the value /
i
p d  is less than the geometric mean of the two nearest integers 
and [ / ]
i
p d otherwise. In Deans’ solution rounding is based on comparison to the harmonic mean (Young, 1994). 
3. Degressively proportional allocation of seats 
Some cases, however, preclude the proportional representation of citizens. Such situation occurs in the European 
Parliament due to large diversity of populations of the Member States.   
Therefore seats in the European Parliament are allocated in accordance with the "Degressive Proportionality 
Principle”. It was introduced in art. 1 point 15 of the Lisbon Treaty: “The European Parliament shall be composed of 
representatives of the Union's citizens. They shall not exceed seven hundred and fifty in number, plus the President. 
Representation of citizens shall be degressively proportional, with a minimum threshold of six members per Member 
State. No Member State shall be allocated more than ninety-six seats.” (Lisbon Treaty, 2007) and firstly interpreted 
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in 2007 in the Report of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs and the European Parliament Resolution 
(Lamassoure & Severin, 2007): 
“The principle of degressive proportionality provided for in Article [9a] of the Treaty on European Union shall 
be applied as follows: 
• the minimum and maximum numbers set by the Treaty must be fully utilised to ensure that the allocation of seats 
in the European Parliament reflects as closely as possible the range of populations of the Member States; 
• the larger the population of a country, the greater its entitlement to a large number of seats; 
• the larger the population of a country, the more inhabitants are represented by each of its Members of the 
European Parliament.” 
 Therefore, on the basis of these two legal acts the formal definition of degressive proportionality is as follows. 
Definition 1. Sequence 
1 2
( , ,..., )
n
s s s s= , 0
i
s ≥ , is degressively proportional with respect to 
1 2
( , ,..., ),
n
p p p p=  0
i
p ≥  and 
1 2
...
n
p p p≤ ≤ ≤ , if it satisfies following conditions: 
 
1 2
...
n
s s s≤ ≤ ≤ , (1) 
 1 2
1 2
...
n
n
pp p
s s s
≤ ≤ ≤ . (2) 
Definition 2. Sequence 
1 2
( , ,..., )
n
s s s s= , 0
i
s ≥ , is degressively proportional with boundary conditions with 
respect 
1 2
( , ,..., )
n
p p p p= , 0
i
p ≥ and 
1 2
...
n
p p p≤ ≤ ≤ , if it is degressively proportional and for a triple 
( , , )m M H  such that m M≤  and m M H+ ≤  satisfies: 
 
1
s m= , 
n
s M= and 
1
n
ii
s H
=
=∑ . (3) 
In given definition M  means the greatest suggested number, m – the smallest and H – the total number of seats 
in the European Parliament. Sequences s and p describe the number of seats and population of particular member 
states. At present we have 6m = , 96M =  and 751H =  . 
Too late ratification of the Lisbon Treaty which entered into force in December 2009 – that is after the beginning 
of seventh European Parliament term – caused the adoption of allocation of seats that wasn’t degressively 
proportional. In 2013 Committee on Constitutional Affairs presented new Report on the composition of the 
European Parliament with a view to the 2014 elections in which interpretation of degressive proportionality has been 
changed (Gualtieri & Trzaskowski, 2013): 
“In the application of the principle of degressive proportionality provided for in the first subparagraph of Article 
14 (2) TEU, the following principles shall apply: 14(2) TEU, the following principles shall apply: 
• the allocation of seats in the European Parliament shall fully utilise the minimum and maximum numbers set by 
the Treaty in order to reflect as closely as possible the sizes of the respective populations of Member States; 
• the ratio between the population and the number of seats of each Member State before rounding to whole 
numbers shall vary in relation to their respective populations in such a way that each Member of the European 
Parliament from a more populous Member State represents more citizens than each Member from a less 
populous Member State and, conversely, that the larger the population of a Member State, the greater its 
entitlement to a large number of seats;” 
In practice the new interpretation, known as the Cambridge Compromise, weakens the rule enabling to determine 
an allocation that doesn’t satisfy condition (2). Instead it must satisfy  
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 1 2
1 2
... ,
( ) ( ) ( )
n
n
pp p
A p A p A p
≤ ≤ ≤  (4) 
where A(x) is a defined in paragraph 4 allocation function with boundary conditions.  
4. Allocation functions 
Allocation functions used to determine the degressive proportional division are associated with classical methods 
of proportional distribution, where elements of the sequence of quotas q are values of the linear function f(x) = ax. In 
the case of degressive proportionality it is usually impossible to use it – linear function does not meet the boundary 
conditions m and M, for example. Therefore, we define degressively proportional allocation function as follows. 
Definition 3. Function 
1
: [ , ] [ , ]
n
A p p m M→  is for a given 
1 2
( , ,..., )
n
p p p p= an allocation function with 
boundary conditions ( , , )m M H  if: 
1 2
( , ,..., )
n
q q q q= , where ( )
i i
q A p=  is degressively proportional with respect to p. (5) 
 
1
( )A p m= , ( )
n
A p M= . (6) 
We call the allocation function with boundary conditions exact if additionally 
1
( )
n
ii
A p H
=
=∑  holds. 
There are indubitably many functions satisfying conditions of definition 3. Five very natural families of 
allocation functions always returning degressively proportional allocation are described in (Słomczyński & 
Życzkowski, 2011). Depending on sequence p and values of , ,m M H   they are characterized by various properties. 
With a view to adapt them to the European Parliament, we may consider the following families:  
 1( ) min , ,
I
x p
A x m M
−⎛ ⎞
= +⎜ ⎟δ⎝ ⎠
 (7) 
where 11 ;n
p pp
m M m
−
≤ δ ≤
−
 
 
1
( ) min , ,n
II
x pmx
A x M
p
⎛ ⎞−
= +⎜ ⎟
δ⎝ ⎠
 (8) 
where 1n
p p
M m
−
δ ≥
−
; 
1
1
1 1 1
( ) ( )( )n
III n
n n n
p xx p M m
A x x x p p x
p p p p p p
⎛ ⎞−−
= + − δ − −⎜ ⎟
− −⎝ ⎠
, (9) 
where 
( )
( )
11
2
1
1
min , // /
0
nn
n
n
M m mp p Mm p M p
p p p p
− −−
≥ δ − ≥
− −
; 
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 1
1 1
( ) ,n
IV
n n
x p p x
A x M m
p p p p
δ δ δ δ
δ δ δ δ
− −
= +
− −
 (10) 
where 0 1≤ δ ≤  and ( ) ( )1/ 1 / 1nM m p p
δ
− δ ≤ − ; 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1
1 1
/ ( ) / ( )
( )
/ ( ) / ( )
n
V
n n
M x M x p m x m p x
A x
p M x p p m p x
−δ − + − δ −
=
− δ − + − δ −
, (11) 
where 
1
/p Mδ ≤ .   
In each family parameter δ is set by the constraint that the total number of seats is fixed. 
5. Composition of the EP with the use of classical methods 
Hamilton’s and divisor methods give a solution of finding an allocation of indivisible goods in the most 
proportionate way by treating the vector of quotas as an “ideal” division. The allocation functions may be 
considered in a similar manner in the context of degressively proportional allocations. A sequence 
1 2
( ( ), ( ),..., ( ))
n
A p A p A p  may be used as a degressively proportional pattern on the basis of which an allocation 
using classical methods is determined. Achieved allocation fulfills the “weakened” definition of degressive 
proportionality, i.e. it satisfies conditions (1), (2’), (3). 
Table 1 presents degressively proportional bases determined for each class of the specified allocation functions. 
Calculations were based on data from 2012. Such choice was dictated by the use of them in 2013 Report. 
      Table 1. Degressively proportional bases determined by allocation functions 
Country Population ( )
I
A p   ( )
II
A p  ( )IIIA p  ( )IVA p  ( )VA p  
Malta 416,110 6 6 6 6 6 
Luxemburg 524,853 6.132021 7.567994 6.14401 6.18152 6.145657 
Cyprus 862,011 6.541352 8.763056 6.59011 6.723476 6.596742 
Estonia 1,339,622 7.121203 9.277559 7.220998 7.45653 7.234386 
Latvia 2,041,763 7.973647 10.03394 8.146242 8.489082 8.168923 
Slovenia 2,055,496 7.99032 10.04873 8.164312 8.508879 8.187167 
Lithuania 3,007,758 9.146427 11.07455 9.414837 9.85392 9.449092 
Ireland 4,582,769 11.05859 12.77121 11.47244 11.99104 11.52268 
Finland 5,401,267 12.0523 13.65294 12.53646 13.07104 12.59364 
Slovakia 5,404,322 12.05601 13.65623 12.54042 13.07504 12.59763 
Denmark 5,580,516 12.26992 13.84603 12.76899 13.3053 12.82757 
Bulgaria 7,327,224 14.39054 15.72766 15.02589 15.55241 15.09594 
Austria 8,443,018 15.74518 16.92964 16.45899 16.95918 16.53438 
Sweden 9,482,855 17.00761 18.04979 17.78849 18.25355 17.86754 
Hungary 9,957,731 17.58414 18.56135 18.39371 18.83988 18.47403 
Czech Rep. 10,505,445 18.2491 19.15137 19.09026 19.51271 19.17172 
Portugal 10,541,840 18.29328 19.19058 19.13649 19.55729 19.21802 
Belgium 11,041,266 18.89962 19.72858 19.77012 20.16755 19.85239 
Greece 11,290,067 19.20168 19.9966 20.08528 20.47054 20.16782 
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Country Population ( )
I
A p   ( )
II
A p  ( )IIIA p  ( )IVA p  ( )VA p  
Netherlands 16,730,348 25.80653 25.8571 26.89312 26.95219 26.96695 
Romania 21,355,849 31.42218 30.83989 32.55595 32.29508 32.60397 
Poland 38,538,447 52.28296 49.34971 52.58262 51.29248 52.46152 
Spain 46,196,276 61.58005 57.59904 60.99559 59.46046 60.79963 
Italy 60,820,764 79.33512 73.35316 76.18442 74.70396 75.92431 
U. Kingdom 62,989,550 81.96816 75.68947 78.33879 76.93125 78.08287 
France 65,397,912 84.89207 78.28386 80.70146 79.39565 80.45543 
Germany 81,843,743 96 96 96 96 96 
Total – 751 751 751 751 751 
Δ – 823679.8 928296.3 1.60E-13 0.9005 –3621087 
 
It is easy to see that the first class favors more populated countries, second - the smaller ones. Other families 
return similar sequences. Therefore, willing to eliminate the effect of deviation, it is desirable to indicate a measure  
enabling to compare the results. For that purpose one may use an index of internal degression describing the biggest 
deviation from proportionality, proposed by J. Łyko (Łyko, 2013). The measure is based on a number 
max (| |)
I i i
U u= , where 
*
*
i
i
i
z u
u
z u
−
=
+
, 1
1( ) ( )
i i
i
i i
p p
z
A p A p
+
+
−
=
−
, 1*
1( ) ( )
n
n
p p
u
A p A p
−
=
−
, for 1,2,..., 1i n= − . Table 2 
shows values of the coefficients ui and UI for each class of allocation functions. 
       Table 2. Internal degression of allocation functions 
Country Population ( )
I
A p   ( )
II
A p  ( )IIIA p  ( )IVA p  ( )VA p  
Malta 416,110 – – – – – 
Luxemburg 524,853 0.04690 0.85761 0.09015 0.20327 0.09579 
Cyprus 862,011 0.04690 0.52459 0.08971 0.18511 0.09522 
Estonia 1,339,622 0.04691 0.01284 0.08888 0.16270 0.09416 
Latvia 2,041,763 0.04690 0.01284 0.08769 0.14182 0.09264 
Slovenia 2,055,496 0.04691 0.01297 0.08696 0.13204 0.09171 
Lithuania 3,007,758 0.04690 0.01284 0.08598 0.12201 0.09048 
Ireland 4,582,769 0.04690 0.01285 0.08340 0.10219 0.08724 
Finland 5,401,267 0.04691 0.01284 0.08094 0.08834 0.08417 
Slovakia 5,404,322 0.04704 0.01299 0.07952 0.08451 0.08327 
Denmark 5,580,516 0.04690 0.01285 0.07991 0.08357 0.08288 
Bulgaria 7,327,224 0.04691 0.01284 0.07792 0.07576 0.08044 
Austria 8,443,018 0.04690 0.01284 0.07495 0.06572 0.07680 
Sweden 9,482,855 0.04691 0.01285 0.07269 0.05936 0.07406 
Hungary 9,957,731 0.04690 0.01284 0.07110 0.05531 0.07214 
Czech Rep. 10,505,445 0.04690 0.01285 0.07003 0.05277 0.07084 
Portugal 10,541,840 0.04684 0.01280 0.06944 0.05133 0.07019 
Belgium 11,041,266 0.04691 0.01285 0.06885 0.05012 0.06943 
Greece 11,290,067 0.04690 0.01284 0.06806 0.04844 0.06849 
Netherlands 16,730,348 0.04690 0.01284 0.06199 0.03751 0.06136 
Romania 21,355,849 0.04690 0.01284 0.05108 0.02204 0.04880 
Poland 38,538,447 0.04690 0.01284 0.02653 0.00016 0.02229 
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Country Population ( )
I
A p   ( )
II
A p  ( )IIIA p  ( )IVA p  ( )VA p  
Spain 46,196,276 0.04690 0.01285 0.00302 0.01780 0.00749 
Italy 60,820,764 0.04690 0.01284 0.03111 0.02931 0.03322 
U. Kingdom 62,989,550 0.04690 0.01284 0.05333 0.03672 0.05236 
France 65,397,912 0.04691 0.01284 0.05955 0.03853 0.05747 
Germany 81,843,743 0.24139 0.01284 0.08599 0.04522 0.07807 
Max – 0.24139 0.85761 0.09015 0.20327 0.09579 
Mean – 0.05439 0.06503 0.06918 0.07660 0.07081 
I
U /mean – 4.438346 13.18852 1.303109 2.653558 1.352822 
 
Function ( )
III
A p  is therefore most reliable in the sense of proportionality. Taking then into account the entire 
structure of the allocation, it determines the most preferable pattern division. Allocations based on function ( )
III
A p  
shows Table 3. Columns 3–8 contain allocations 
Ha
s , 
We
s , 
Je
s , 
Ad
s , 
Hi
s  and 
De
s  which were obtained in the 
generalized methods of Hamilton, Webster, Jefferson, Adams, Hill and Dean. It is worth noting that the allocation 
obtained using the Hamilton method matches the result obtained by the Webster, Hill and Dean method. 
Apportionments for the remaining families of functions are presented in the Appendix. 
Table 3. Proposal of allocation of seats in the European Parliament based on the function ( )
III
A x  
Country Population 
Has
 
Wes
 
Jes
 
Ads
 
Hi
s  Des  
Malta 416,110 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Luxemburg 524,853 6 6 6 7 6 6 
Cyprus 862,011 7 7 6 7 7 7 
Estonia 1,339,622 7 7 7 8 7 7 
Latvia 2,041,763 8 8 8 9 8 8 
Slovenia 2,055,496 8 8 8 9 8 8 
Lithuania 3,007,758 9 9 9 10 9 9 
Ireland 4,582,769 11 11 11 12 11 11 
Finland 5,401,267 13 13 12 13 13 13 
Slovakia 5,404,322 13 13 12 13 13 13 
Denmark 5,580,516 13 13 13 13 13 13 
Bulgaria 7,327,224 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Austria 8,443,018 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Sweden 9,482,855 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Hungary 9,957,731 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Czech Rep. 10,505,445 19 19 19 19 19 19 
Portugal 10,541,840 19 19 19 19 19 19 
Belgium 11,041,266 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Greece 11,290,067 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Netherlands 16,730,348 27 27 27 26 27 27 
Romania 21,355,849 33 33 33 32 33 33 
Poland 38,538,447 53 53 53 52 53 53 
Spain 46,196,276 61 61 62 60 61 61 
Italy 60,820,764 76 76 77 75 76 76 
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Country Population 
Ha
s  
We
s  
Je
s  
Ad
s  
Hi
s  
De
s  
U. Kingdom 62,989,550 78 78 79 78 78 78 
France 65,397,912 81 81 81 80 81 81 
Germany 81,843,743 96 96 96 96 96 96 
Total – 751 751 751 751 751 751 
6. Conclusion 
The analysis shows that in each of the considered five families of functions there is an unambiguously 
determined exact allocation function. Real degressively proportional allocations 
1 2
( ( ), ( ),..., ( ))
n
A p A p A p  generated 
by them substantially differ from each other. For functions ( )
I
A x  and ( )
II
A x , a bias may be clearly noticed. First 
of them favors more populated countries, second – the smaller ones. According to applied criterion of internal 
degression measure, the best solution is the adoption of the allocation function ( )
III
A x . It is difficult, therefore, to 
agree with the statement contained in the Report on the composition of the European Parliament with a view to the 
2014 elections that proposition of the Cambridge Compromise using function ( )
I
A x  is “the most ‘proportional’ 
mechanism respecting degressive proportionality” (Gualtieri & Trzaskowski, 2013). 
Appendix. Proposal of allocation of seats in the European Parliament based on the allocation function 
generated using classical methods (families I, II, IV, V) 
Table 4. Proposal of allocation of seats in the European Parliament based on the allocation function generated using classical methods  
(families I, II) 
Country Population ( )
I
A p   ( )
II
A p  
Has
 
Wes
 
Jes
 
Ads
 
Hi
s  Des  Has  Wes  Jes  Ads  His  Des  
Malta 416,110 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Luxemburg 524,853 6 6 6 7 6 6 7 8 7 8 8 8 
Cyprus 862,011 7 7 6 7 7 7 9 9 9 8 9 9 
Estonia 1,339,622 7 7 7 8 7 7 9 9 10 9 9 9 
Latvia 2,041,763 8 8 8 8 8 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Slovenia 2,055,496 8 8 8 8 8 8 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Lithuania 3,007,758 9 9 9 10 9 9 11 11 11 11 11 11 
Ireland 4,582,769 11 11 11 11 11 11 13 13 13 13 13 13 
Finland 5,401,267 12 12 12 12 12 12 14 13 14 13 13 13 
Slovakia 5,404,322 12 12 12 12 12 12 14 14 14 13 14 14 
Denmark 5,580,516 12 12 12 13 12 12 14 14 14 14 14 14 
Bulgaria 7,327,224 14 14 14 15 14 14 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Austria 8,443,018 16 16 15 16 16 16 17 17 17 17 17 17 
Sweden 9,482,855 17 17 17 17 17 17 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Hungary 9,957,731 18 18 17 18 18 18 18 18 19 18 18 18 
Czech Rep. 10,505,445 18 18 18 18 18 18 19 19 19 19 19 19 
Portugal 10,541,840 18 18 18 18 18 18 19 19 19 19 19 19 
Belgium 11,041,266 19 19 19 19 19 19 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Greece 11,290,067 19 19 19 19 19 19 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Netherlands 16,730,348 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 
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Country Population ( )
I
A p   ( )
II
A p  
  
Has
 
Wes
 
Jes
 
Ads
 
Hi
s  Des  Has  Wes  Jes  Ads  His  Des  
Romania 21,355,849 32 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 
Poland 38,538,447 52 52 53 52 52 52 49 49 49 49 49 49 
Spain 46,196,276 62 62 62 61 62 62 58 58 57 58 58 58 
Italy 60,820,764 79 80 80 78 80 80 73 73 73 74 73 73 
U. Kingdom 62,989,550 82 82 83 81 82 82 76 76 75 76 76 76 
France 65,397,912 85 85 86 84 85 85 78 78 78 79 78 78 
Germany 81,843,743 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
Total - 751 751 751 751 751 751 751 751 751 751 751 751 
Table 5. Proposal of allocation of seats in the European Parliament based on the allocation function generated using classical methods  
(families IV, V) 
Country Population ( )IVA p  ( )VA p  
Has
 
Wes
 
Jes
 
Ads
 
Hi
s  Des  Has  Wes  Jes  Ads  His  Des  
Malta 416,110 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Luxemburg 524,853 6 6 6 7 6 6 6 6 6 7 6 6 
Cyprus 862,011 7 7 6 7 7 7 7 7 6 7 7 7 
Estonia 1,339,622 7 7 7 8 7 7 7 7 7 8 7 7 
Latvia 2,041,763 9 8 8 9 9 9 8 8 8 9 8 8 
Slovenia 2,055,496 9 9 8 9 9 9 8 8 8 9 8 8 
Lithuania 3,007,758 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 9 9 10 9 9 
Ireland 4,582,769 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 11 12 12 12 
Finland 5,401,267 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 12 13 13 13 
Slovakia 5,404,322 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 12 13 13 13 
Denmark 5,580,516 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
Bulgaria 7,327,224 16 16 16 16 16 16 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Austria 8,443,018 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 16 17 17 
Sweden 9,482,855 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Hungary 9,957,731 19 19 19 19 19 19 18 18 19 18 18 18 
Czech Rep. 10,505,445 20 20 20 19 20 20 19 19 19 19 19 19 
Portugal 10,541,840 20 20 20 19 20 20 19 19 19 19 19 19 
Belgium 11,041,266 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Greece 11,290,067 20 21 21 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Netherlands 16,730,348 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 26 27 27 
Romania 21,355,849 32 32 33 32 32 32 33 33 33 32 33 33 
Poland 38,538,447 51 51 51 51 51 51 52 52 53 52 52 52 
Spain 46,196,276 59 59 60 59 59 59 61 61 62 60 61 61 
Italy 60,820,764 75 75 75 75 75 75 76 76 76 75 76 76 
U. Kingdom 62,989,550 77 77 77 77 77 77 78 78 78 78 78 78 
France 65,397,912 79 79 79 79 79 79 80 80 81 80 80 80 
Germany 81,843,743 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
Total – 751 751 751 751 751 751 751 751 751 751 751 751 
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  Table 6. Minimal and maximal number of seats obtained using allocation functions (families I–V)  
Country Population Min Max 
Malta 416,110 6 6 
Luxemburg 524,853 6 7 
Cyprus 862,011 6 9 
Estonia 1,339,622 7 10 
Latvia 2,041,763 8 10 
Slovenia 2,055,496 8 10 
Lithuania 3,007,758 9 11 
Ireland 4,582,769 11 13 
Finland 5,401,267 12 14 
Slovakia 5,404,322 12 14 
Denmark 5,580,516 12 14 
Bulgaria 7,327,224 14 16 
Austria 8,443,018 15 17 
Sweden 9,482,855 17 18 
Hungary 9,957,731 17 19 
Czech Rep. 10,505,445 18 20 
Portugal 10,541,840 18 20 
Belgium 11,041,266 19 20 
Greece 11,290,067 19 21 
Netherlands 16,730,348 26 27 
Romania 21,355,849 31 33 
Poland 38,538,447 49 53 
Spain 46,196,276 57 62 
Italy 60,820,764 73 80 
U. Kingdom 62,989,550 75 83 
France 65,397,912 78 86 
Germany 81,843,743 96 96 
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